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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been troubled of late by 
widespread social unrest, slowing economic growth, and rampant of-
ficial corruption as revealed by the Bo Xilai scandal. Less obvious to 
the outside world, however, have been the two sharply contrasting and 
controversial perspectives on the country’s near- to medium-term future 
that are now locked in mutual contention. These two rival scenarios 
reflect fundamentally different assessments of the socioeconomic situa-
tion and likely political trajectory of the world’s most populous country. 
The first scenario envisions an abrupt bottom-up revolution. This as-
sessment has recently generated much heated intellectual and political 
debate in the PRC. In December 2011, the thirty-year-old best-selling 
author Han Han (China’s most popular blogger whose site has regis-
tered well over 580 million hits) posted a now-famous essay titled “On 
Revolution.”1 Although Han argues that “revolution is hardly a good 
option for China,” his intriguing view of the choice between reform and 
revolution has pointedly reflected—and greatly enhanced—the public 
awareness of the risk of revolution in the country. 
Additionally, one of the most popular books in PRC intellectual cir-
cles today is the Chinese translation of Alexis de Tocqueville’s 1856 
classic The Old Regime and the Revolution. One frequently quoted pas-
sage is Tocqueville’s argument that revolutions usually occur not when 
the old regime resists change, but rather when it begins to attempt reform 
only to find expectations outstripping any possible rate of improvement. 
The second scenario is reform from above, which Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) elites often refer to as “top-level reform” or the “top-level 
design of reform” (gaige de dingceng sheji). The latter term was first 
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heard at a top CCP leadership meeting in October 2010.2 It is related to 
the leaders’ newfound understanding that China is now in “deep water” 
with regard to reform, and can no longer afford to “cross the river by feel-
ing the stones,” as the Chinese expression goes. Improvised reform, in 
short, needs to give way to a more methodical and more profound set of 
changes. Moreover, with so many of China’s present-day socioeconomic 
problems growing out of impasses and obstacles within the political sys-
tem, basic political reform will have to be part of the agenda as well. 
According to those who call for top-level reform, China needs better 
coordination between socioeconomic policy and political development, 
along with structural changes that are more coherent. The older, bottom-up 
approach that stresses grassroots elections must yield, they say, to a new 
roadmap that includes intra-CCP elections to choose national-level Party 
leaders, enhanced institutional checks and balances, and judicial reform.3
It is critically important for foreign analysts to grasp the ongoing Chi-
nese discourse in three key areas: 1) the impact of the Bo Xilai crisis on 
China’s political trajectory, 2) possible triggers for sociopolitical upris-
ings and initiatives, and 3) institutional safeguards with which the CCP 
leadership may open the way to systemic change. Foreign analysts need 
to rethink the thesis of “authoritarian resilience,” a predominant view in 
overseas studies of Chinese politics which argues that Chinese authori-
tarianism is “resilient” or “strong.”4 This view underestimates both the 
inherent vulnerability in the one-party system and the growing resentment 
that the public feels over CCP leaders’ enormous power and wealth. 
1) Bo Xilai and the Illusion of CCP Meritocracy. In 2012, the Bo 
Xilai affair put the political system’s deep flaws on display. Although 
the CCP has been guilty of political repression and grave mistakes dur-
ing its long rule, its senior leaders have generally not been known for 
gangland-style murders. But now Bo’s wife has been convicted of plot-
ting the murder of a British business associate; and Bo’s former lieu-
tenant, the police chief of Chongqing, has also been found guilty of 
abusing his power. The public is left wondering: What expectations of 
impunity moved Bo, well known as Party chief of Chongqing and a 
rising star in top CCP ranks, to engage in the misdeeds alleged on his 
long charge sheet? How could this iron-fisted leader, most famous for 
cracking down on organized crime in Chongqing, have been running the 
city’s police force in a lawless and at times outright criminal fashion? 
The current CCP leadership dismisses these incidents as “isolated 
and exceptional,” but many PRC intellectuals argue that rampant of-
ficial corruption, especially when involving relatives of senior Party 
leaders, exemplifies an especially decadent form of crony capitalism 
that of late has become more the rule than the exception.5 In addition 
to the Bo scandal, another separate and pending corruption case—
one that involves former top officials of the Railways Ministry taking 
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bribes totaling several billion U.S. dollars—has vividly shown the 
public that national-level elite corruption is occurring at a scale never 
seen before.6
One of the official charges against Bo is that “he made erroneous deci-
sions in the promotion of personnel, resulting in serious consequences.” 
Chinese critics find this charge particularly ironic, asking why those who 
promoted Bo should not also be held accountable for their own even 
greater “erroneous decisions.” In a dramatic and astonishing way, the Bo 
imbroglio belies the notion—so central to the authoritarian-resilience the-
sis—that the CCP elite is in any way a meritocracy. In the eyes of the 
Chinese public, the current method of selecting PRC leaders––with its 
nepotism, patron-client ties, “black-box” manipulation by political heavy-
weights, fake academic credentials, and even the use of bribes to “pur-
chase office” (maiguan)––looks to be based on anything but merit.7 The 
legitimacy of the CCP leadership as a whole is now in doubt. Bo’s trial 
(expected to occur sometime in 2013) may turn into a trial of the CCP’s 
monopoly on power, which made Bo’s decade of abusing his authority 
possible in the first place.
It should be noted that Bo still has a significant number of sup-
porters in China. His strongly nationalist views, his tendency to use 
violence to resolve socioeconomic conflicts, his pronounced hatred 
of the rich, and his reputation as a leader who can get things done are 
traits that resonate deeply with some groups in Chinese society. Fur-
thermore, unless China profoundly changes its method of governance, 
demagogues even more brazen and despicable than Bo may well arise 
in the future.
2) A Bottom-Up Revolution in the Making? The CCP legitimacy 
crisis that the Bo incident has sparked is, of course, not the only factor 
that could lead to a sociopolitical uprising. After more than two decades 
of remarkably rapid economic growth, China has recently experienced 
a slowdown. This downturn is not only born of political bottlenecks, 
but will further reveal flaws in the PRC’s authoritarian system and thus 
become a trigger for political crises. The growing oligarchic power 
of state-owned enterprises, especially gigantic flagship companies, is 
widely viewed as driving massive corruption, crowding out private in-
vestment, shrinking the middle class, and stalling the innovation that 
China must achieve if it is to make the transition from an export-led 
economy to one oriented toward consumption and innovation.
The sense of political uncertainty––and fear of socioeconomic and 
other disasters––is on the rise in China. Many worry about environmen-
tal degradation, public-health hazards, and all manner of public-safety 
problems. Anxiety and discontent touch all socioeconomic classes. The 
large flow of capital leaving China in recent years is a signal that the 
elites themselves lack confidence in the country’s political stability. 
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According to a 2011 report by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), from 
2000 to 2009 China’s illegal capital outflow was the world’s highest 
at US$2.7 trillion.8 The latest GFI report, released in October 2012, 
showed that cumulative illicit financial flows from China totaled a mas-
sive $3.8 trillion for the period from 2000 to 2011.9
Middle-class anger at government policies has become increasing-
ly evident in recent years. An unemployment rate of about 20 percent 
among recent college graduates (who usually come from middle-class 
families and are presumed to be members of China’s future middle class) 
should send an alarming signal to the Chinese government. Given how 
hard it is to get a small-business loan, the opaque and poorly regulated 
nature of the Chinese stock market, and the general lack of investment 
opportunities, middle-class savings have flowed heavily into real estate. 
The nightmare of a bursting property bubble is a real possibility: Some 
regions are dotted with massive but tenantless areas of new construction 
known as “ghost cities.” A study conducted by the Beijing Municipal 
Security Bureau revealed that there are 3.8 million vacant housing units 
in the capital alone.10
Lower down the social scale, the manual-labor shortage that has hit 
some coastal cities in recent years reflects the growing awareness of 
individual rights among “vulnerable social groups.” Migrant workers 
especially will move from job to job seeking better pay. Yet China’s 
urbanization policy is noticeably unaccommodating to migrants. Such 
workers resent seeing middle-class families with multiple homes and 
corrupt officials or rich entrepreneurs who buy costly villas for their 
mistresses. 
Given the CCP elite’s interest in preserving its own grip on power, 
it is no surprise that the police have become more powerful, with an 
influence over socioeconomic policy that matches their bigger budgets. 
The total sum spent on “maintaining social stability” now exceeds the 
amount spent on national defense.11 The growing power of the police 
has also created a vicious circle in which the more fiercely the police 
suppress unrest, the more violent and widespread it grows. With all the 
sources of social resentment, possible triggering factors, and disturb-
ing trends, one should not be too quick to disregard the scenario of a 
bottom-up revolution.
3) Will Intra-Party Democracy Work? Given the ominous portent 
of the Bo Xilai crisis and its airing of the CCP’s dirty laundry, as well 
as many other sources and triggering factors for bottom-up revolution, 
what are the prospects that the CCP leadership will act to save itself by 
undertaking systemic political reform? Does the Party have a chance? 
Since the era of Deng Xiaoping (and especially in the last ten years), 
a few institutional reforms designed to promote intra-CCP democracy 
have been gradually put into place. Authorities and the state-run media 
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often speak of “intra-Party democracy” as a byword for institutionalized 
checks and balances within the CCP. In September 2009, the Fourth Ple-
nary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee called for promot-
ing democracy within the Party and characterized intra-Party democracy 
as the “lifeblood” of the Party and the principal determinant of whether 
the CCP would be able to maintain its position of primacy in the future.
It is understandable that CCP leaders and their advisors are inclined 
to pursue democratic experiments within the Party, or in other words, 
to carry out political reform in a way that is incremental and manage-
able. The CCP is the world’s largest ruling party, consisting of 4 mil-
lion grassroots branches and 83 million members. In the absence of any 
organized opposition, one can hardly expect China to suddenly adopt a 
multiparty political system. Under these circumstances, a form of intra-
Party democracy—one characterized by elite competition, balance of 
power among factions, and links to distinct interest groups in Chinese 
society—may well be a more realistic way to promote democracy in the 
country.
The path to democracy varies from nation to nation, and depends 
largely on a country’s historical and sociopolitical circumstances. Chi-
nese leaders and public intellectuals have every right to argue that the 
PRC’s version of democracy will, and should, have its own distinct (or 
even unique) features. After all, the democratic regimes that one finds in 
India, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are distinct 
from one another in significant ways. Moreover, it is even possible for 
a democracy—Japan is an example, as is Mexico—to undergo lengthy 
stretches of one-party government without losing the right to be called a 
democracy. A dynamic interplay of checks and balances among ruling-
party factions is often a key to this achievement.
In China today, intra-CCP democracy is more than just rhetoric. A 
number of important institutional developments have already changed 
the way that China’s political elite does business. Holders of top posts 
in both the Party and the state now serve terms capped at five years, and 
no official may serve more than two terms. Leaders above a certain level 
cannot exceed a set age limit. For example, all CCP Central Committee 
members who were born before 1940 retired from that body at the 2007 
Party Congress. Similarly, all Central Committee members who were 
born before 1944 retired from that body at the 2012 Party Congress. 
The CCP has endorsed a method known as the “more candidates than 
seats election” (cha’e xuanju) in order to choose members of the Central 
Committee and other higher bodies. These rules and norms not only 
spawn a sense of consistency and fairness in the selection of leaders, but 
also speed up turnover within the elite.12
Such experiments in intra-Party democracy, however, have made lit-
tle progress since 2009. The scope and scale of intra-Party competition 
have not increased much over the past two decades. Despite promises to 
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The CCP leadership is 
now structured around 
two informal coalitions 
or factions that check and 
balance each other, a major 
departure from the strong-
man traditions of the Mao 
and Deng eras.
the contrary, top posts at various levels are still not filled by means of 
multicandidate elections. 
Yet it remains important that the CCP leadership is now structured 
around two informal coalitions or factions that check and balance each 
other. This is not the kind of institutionalized system by which, say, the 
U.S. government’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches check 
and balance one another. But it does 
represent a major departure from the 
strongman traditions of the Mao and 
Deng eras, and it is reshaping the 
inner workings of high-level intra-
Party politics in China.
The two groups can be labeled the 
“populist coalition,” led by outgoing 
president Hu Jintao, and the “elitist 
coalition,” which emerged during the 
Jiang Zemin era and is currently led 
by Jiang’s top protégés. At the Eigh-
teenth Party Congress in November 
2012, Xi Jinping from the elitist faction became the secretary-general of 
the Party, and Li Keqiang from the populist faction was designated to 
become China’s premier. This division of power is sometimes referred to 
as the “one party, two coalitions” political mechanism.
These two coalitions represent different socioeconomic and geo-
graphical constituencies. Most of the top leaders in the elitist coalition, 
for instance, are “princelings” from families of veteran revolutionaries 
and high-ranking officials. These princelings often began their careers 
in rich and economically well-developed coastal cities. The elitist coali-
tion usually represents the interests of China’s entrepreneurs.
Most of the populist coalition’s leading figures, by contrast, come 
from less-privileged families. They also tend to have accumulated much 
of their leadership experience in less-developed inland provinces. Many 
of these leaders began their respective climbs up the political ladder via 
leadership in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) and are 
known as the tuanpai (League faction). The populists often voice the 
concerns of vulnerable social groups such as farmers, migrant workers, 
and the urban poor.
Leaders of these two competing factions differ in expertise, creden-
tials, and experiences. Yet they understand that they must find common 
ground in order to coexist and govern effectively, especially in times of 
crisis—and now is such a time. A factional leader such as the princeling 
Bo Xilai may fall due to scandal, but the factions themselves are too 
strong to be dismantled.
The rise of a subdued form of Chinese “bipartisanship” within the 
leadership may still not be enough to save the CCP, however. Cutting 
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deals, sharing power, and arriving at compromises can be hard. More-
over, the presence of more candidates than there are seats to fill natu-
rally creates a sense of winners and losers. Nor are contentious issues 
lacking: There are serious disputes brewing over how best to distrib-
ute national resources, the optimal methods for fighting corruption, the 
establishment of a public healthcare system, the construction of more 
affordable housing in the cities, and the reform of finance and of ru-
ral landownership. Can a consensus on these matters wide and strong 
enough to support effective governance be formed? The question re-
mains an open one. 
China’s much-needed political reform may be delayed due to the 
strong resistance from some conservative leaders and vested interest 
groups such as state-monopolized large firms. Public demand for a more 
competitive, more institutionalized, more transparent political system 
will, however, only become stronger. Factional competition and coop-
eration in the top leadership may be all the more consequential because 
they are in accord with what important new stabilizing forces—none of 
which existed in 1989—desire for China. Along with a larger middle 
class, the country has a more assertive legal profession that argues for 
constitutionalism and strong measures to curb corruption and abuses of 
power. The media, too, are more commercialized and influential, and 
social media have achieved a level of pervasiveness that no one could 
have imagined only a few years ago. 
Various other interest groups, including foreign business lobbies, 
have become more numerous. Most important, there is a widespread 
perception that China, its current economic problems notwithstanding, 
is on the rise rather than the decline. All these factors should enhance 
public confidence that a political transformation could go well and point 
in the direction of a freer and more open China.
The competitive dynamics within the collective CCP leadership, mean-
while, should have the effects of making lobbying more transparent, fac-
tional politics more legitimate, rules and laws more respected, elections 
more genuine, and elites more accountable and representative. Could the 
CCP itself split formally into elitist and populist camps? It is not difficult 
to imagine this happening. In the best case, the split will be more incre-
mental than traumatic, violence will be absent or minimal, and the example 
of elections and competition within the CCP will, via a classic “demonstra-
tion effect,” promote the cause of general elections for the whole country. 
Over the next decade or so, the Middle Kingdom’s future will hinge 
on the dynamic between the fear of revolution and the hope for political 
reform. The threat of revolution from below may push the elite to pur-
sue incremental yet bold political reform. Should reform fail, however, 
revolt may well be the upshot. And the unfolding drama, wherever it 
leads, will undoubtedly have profound ramifications far beyond China’s 
borders.
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